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INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, the Narragansett Indian Tribe ("Tribe")1 created the 
Narragansett Indian Wetuornuck Housing Authority ("Authority").2 
1. The word "tribe" has been used in several contexts to connote different meanings. 
The Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 defines "Indian tribe" as "any In­
dian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of 
the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2) (1994). Currently, 
the Secretary of the Interior recognizes 557 tribes within the United States. DAVID H. 
GETCHES E T  AL., CASES AND MATERIALS O N  FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 8 (4th ed. 1998). Of 
these 557 federally recognized tribes, 226 are native villages in Alaska. Id. Not all tribes, 
however, are federally recognized. Id. at 11. Federal recognition does not constitute a group 
as a tribe. Rather, federal recognition merely extends acknowledgement of tribal status. For 
a number of reasons, a tribe may not be federally recognized. For instance, in the 1950s, the 
United States government pursued a policy of termination. Under the termination policy, 
Congress unilaterally ended its federal relationship with more than 100 tribes. Id. Most 
tribes, which are not federally recognized, seek federal recognition through the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. Further, status as a non-federally recognized tribe does not mean that the 
tribe may not retain rights vis-a-vis the United States. For more information on the reserved 
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The Authority, which acts on the Tribe's behalf in its housing devel­
opment and operations, entered into a contract with the Ninigret 
Development Corporation for the construction of a low-income 
housing development.3 After construction began, disputes developed 
over how to proceed with the construction. When conciliation efforts 
failed, the Authority cancelled the contract.4 The Narragansett Tribal 
Council, the governing body of the Tribe, followed the forum selection 
clause5 in the contract and notified the disputants that it would hold a 
hearing to resolve the dispute.6 Ninigret refused to appear at the 
hearing, and the Tribal Council found that Ninigret had failed to fulfill 
its contractual obligations and had incurred liability for the costs to fix 
the problems encountered in the construction of the housing devel­
opment.7 Ninigret ignored the Tribal Council's decision and the avail-
rights of non-federally recognized tribes, see id. at 209-24. See also Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 
U.S. 506 (1940). 
2. See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 
25 (1st Cir. 2000). The Housing Authority was established under tribal ordinance and oper­
ated under regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Ur­
ban Development. Id. at 25-26. 
3. Id. at 26. The Ninigret Development Corporation is a nontribal entity partially owned 
by a member of the Narragansett Indian Tribe. 
4. Id. 
5. Parties to a contract may choose the forum to hear the dispute by including a forum 
selection clause in the contract. In Ninigret, the parties agreed that the Narragansett Tribal 
Council would hear all the disputes. Id. 
6. Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 26. A tribal forum - either a tribal court or a tribal council act­
ing in the capacity of a tribal court - would have had jurisdiction to hear the issues pre­
sented in the dispute notwithstanding the forum selection clause in the contract. Since con­
tact with Europeans, many tribes have adopted court systems to facilitate dispute resolution. 
Courts have also been imposed on tribes through United States legislation. For more infor­
mation on tribal courts, see generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note l, at 373-418; B.J. Jones, 
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and 
Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998). Under current fed­
eral law, tribal courts exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction. See generally Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (criminal jurisdiction); Bryan v. Itasca County, 
426 U.S. 373 (1976) (civil jurisdiction under P.L. 280); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) 
(civil jurisdiction). Even though federal law has limited the ability of tribal courts to exercise 
civil and criminal jurisdiction, in Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 21, the tribal council would have juris­
diction. The tribal court has jurisdiction for one of two reasons. First, some members of the 
Ningret Corp. are tribal members. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1950). The tribe would 
also have jurisdiction over the nonmember owners of Ninigret because their relationship 
with the tribe is consensual. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981); see 
also infra note 46. 
7. Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 26. Although exactly what occurred in the Tribal Council pro­
ceeding is not clear from the appellate court opinion, whether the Tribal Council entered a 
default judgement against Ninigret should not matter because federal courts can revisit ju­
risdictional issues regardless of whether or not a tribal court has made an actual determina­
tion of its jurisdiction. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. The ability of federal 
courts to revisit jurisdictional issues differs from jurisdictional litigation in a state-to-state 
context, wherein a second state can only revisit the jurisdictional issue if it has not been fully 
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able appeals8 and sued the Authority in federal court for breach of 
contract.9 The Authority moved to dismiss the claims for want of ju­
risdiction, claiming that as a tribal agency it was entitled to tribal sov­
ereign immunity,10 and that the Tribal Council should have jurisdiction 
in the case pursuant to the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine 
("tribal exhaustion").1 1  The district court interpreted the forum selec­
tion clause, ruled the clause enforceable, and dismissed Ninigret's 
claims because the appellant had failed to follow the provisions of the 
clause.12  Ninigret appealed. The First Circuit, in Ninigret Development 
Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority,13 deter­
mined that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction by 
hearing the tribe's sovereign immunity defense and interpreting the 
forum selection clause before invoking tribal exhaustion.14 
The procedural history in Ninigret demonstrates the jurisdictional 
banter between tribal and federal forums over dispute resolution ac­
tions involving tribes. In reaction to Ninigret ignoring the Tribal 
Council's decision and filing suit in federal court, the Authority raised 
two defenses - tribal sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion - to 
clarify the jurisdictional question underlying the federal suit, namely 
whether the tribe or the federal government had the authority to re­
solve the dispute. The Authority's invocation of the two defenses, in 
turn, produced the additional question of how federal courts should 
litigated in the first instance and has not been waived. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, l l l  
(1963); DAVID P. CURRIE E T  AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 450-86 (2001 ) .  
8 .  Ninigret, 2fJ7 F.3d at 26. The contract provided Ninigret with an appellate procedure 
following the Tribal Council proceeding, which it ignored. Id. 
9. Id. Even though Ninigret filed six separate claims against the Authority, only the 
breach of contract claim is discussed here in order to simplify the fact pattern. Id. 
10. Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines the doctrine of sovereign immunity as pre­
cluding a "litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a sover­
eign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to suit." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1 979). United States courts have acknowledged the sover­
eign immunity of federal, state, foreign, and tribal governments. See United States v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (holding that Indian tribes retain a defense of tribal 
sovereign immunity); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (establishing a 
common law defense of sovereign immunity for the federal government); Schooner Exch. v. 
M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (extending absolute sovereign immunity to foreign 
nations). 
11. Ninigret, 2fJ7 F.3d at 26, 28. Tribal exhaustion has been defined as the doctrine by 
which "parties who challenge, under federal law, the jurisdiction of a tribal court to entertain 
a cause of action must first present their claim to the tribal court before seeking to defeat 
tribal jurisdiction in any collateral or parallel federal court proceeding." Basil Cook Enters., 
Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (reaffirming the defense of tribal exhaustion); Nat') Farmers 
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (establishing the defense of tribal ex­
haustion). 
12. Ninigret, 2fJ7 F.3d at 26. 
13. 207 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2000). 
14. 207 F.3d at 35. 
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treat the two defenses when filed simultaneously. The question of how 
federal courts should treat these two defenses in determining which 
government - federal or tribal - retains jurisdiction over the dispute 
should be resolved in a manner that recognizes the importance of 
tribal sovereignty and judicial efficiency. 
Under federal civil procedure, tribal governments have a range of 
defenses when sued in federal courts. Tribal governments can file not 
only standard defenses,15 but as governments, tribes may employ de­
fenses that are unavailable to non-governmental defendants. In par­
ticular, the Supreme Court has established the defenses of tribal sov­
ereign immunity and tribal exhaustion for tribal governments and 
entities.16 
The defense of tribal sovereign immunity under federal law in fed­
eral courts ("tribal sovereign immunity")17 stems from the sovereignty 
retained by Indian tribes and acknowledged by the United States gov­
ernment.18 The predecessors of the United States government recog­
nized tribal sovereignty upon initial contact between Indian tribes and 
European colonists. 19  In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,20 the Supreme 
Court distinguished Indian tribes from foreign states while acknowl­
edging them as separate sovereigns.21 The Court described Indian 
15. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
16. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (holding that tribal 
entities retain tribal sovereign immunity in commercial and governmental transactions both 
on and off the reservation); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers 
Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S.845 (1985); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (re­
affirming the defense of tribal sovereign immunity); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 
(discussing tribal sovereign immunity). Nontribal defendants may also file the affirmative 
defense of tribal exhaustion; however, this Note deals specifically with the interplay between 
the two defenses. The interplay between the two defenses only arises when the defendant is 
a tribal entity. 
17. A distinction exists between tribal sovereign immunity under tribal law in tribal 
courts and tribal sovereign immunity under federal law in federal courts. See infra Section 
H.B. 
18. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 73 ("The colonists required the creation of 
legal and political relationships with the tribes in order to legitimate land transactions, trade, 
and military partnerships with them, exclusive of other European powers. Choosing this 
method of dealing itself implied recognition of tribes as self-governing peoples."). 
19. See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832). After achieving inde­
pendence from Great Britain, the United States decided to follow the same government-to­
government relationship with tribes as fostered by the British government. See Ninigret, 207 
F.3d at 29 ("Tribal sovereign immunity 'predates the birth of the Republic.' "). 
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
21. Three United States Supreme Court cases - Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) - form the basis of the federal-tribal relationship. In 
Johnson v. M'lntosh, the Supreme Court held a conveyance made by a tribal chief to a pri­
vate individual invalid because under the doctrine of discovery only the European sovereign 
had the rights to acquire land from the natives. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. The Court, in 
Cherokee Nation, held it did not have jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation's prayer for an 
injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from enforcing state laws that undermined the 
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tribes as "domestic dependent nations;"22 as such, Indian tribes con­
tinue to have a government-to-government ·relationship with the 
United States.23 Through this relationship, Indian tribes retain tribal 
sovereignty,24 and, as a part of that sovereignty, a defense of sovereign 
immunity to suits filed against them in federal courts.25 
Tribal sovereign immunity emerged as a doctrine out of federal 
common law.26 In United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
ability of the Cherokee Nation to govern itself because although the Cherokee Nation was 
sovereign, it did not qualify as a "foreign state" under Article III of the Constitution. 
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The Court affirmed its Cherokee Nation decision in 
Worcester v. Georgia, holding that the state of Georgia could not pass or enforce laws over 
Indian lands because the Constitution expressly authorizes only the 'federal government to 
interact with tribes. 31 U.S. at 557, 561 {explaining that the Court "manifestly consider[ed] 
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, 
within which their authority is exclusive."). 
22. Worcester, 30 U.S. at 17. 
23. 31 U.S. at 557; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) {re­
affirming the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their internal affairs). Despite the Supreme 
Court's early acknowledgment of internal tribal sovereignty, the federal government began 
to encroach upon tribal sovereignty at the end of the nineteenth century. See Robert N. 
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal In­
dian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 97 (1993) {"While the first two hundred and fifty years of 
colonial expansion certainly had resulted in a Joss of much of the Indian land base to Euro­
American settlers, it had not deprived the Indians of sovereignty and self-governing author­
ity over their remaining homelands. Instead, this deprivation resulted·from late nineteenth 
century legal initiatives, again with the full support of legal theory and the courts."). For 
most of the twentieth century, federal Indian policy alternated between policies of assimila­
tion and self-determination. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 140-224. In the 1970s, 
President Nixon initiated a policy of self-determination for Indian tribes. See id. at 226. This 
policy of self-determination has been reaffirmed by every President and Congress since 
President Nixon. See id. at 230. 
24. Under the reserved rights doctrine, Indian tribes retain any and all internal sover­
eign powers that they have not ceded by treaty or agreement to the United States govern­
ment. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 373-76. 
25. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 {1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); 
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 {1919). 
26. Sovereign immunity developed in England prior to the colonization of the New 
World. English Jaw assumed that "the King can do no wrong." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 590 (3d ed. 1999). In transporting the English common Jaw system, 
the United States adopted the defense of sovereign immunity into its legal system. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 590. Federal common law established defenses of sovereign immu­
nity for the federal government, foreign governments, and Indian tribes. See supra note 10. 
The relationships between defenses of sovereign immunity, however, remain unclear. To 
date, questions arise concerning interstate sovereign immunity. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410 (1979) for defenses of federal sovereign immunity against tribes, and defenses of state 
sovereign immunity against tribes. See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
Since the early 1990s, the defense of state sovereign immunity against tribes has been in­
creasingly litigated. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court decided that the federal courts 
did not have jurisdiction over the tribe's suit against the state of Florida to enforce the In­
dian Gaming Regulatory Act because Congress did not have the power to waive the state's 
sovereign immunity through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id. Thus, defenses of sov­
ereign immunity continue to be invoked and vigorously enforced against Indian tribes by 
both state and federal governments. Id.; see also Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 
U.S. 775 {1991). 
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Co. ,27 the Supreme Court held that tribes retain a defense of sovereign 
immunity as part of their retained sovereignty.28 The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the defense of sovereign immunity for tribes under federal 
law in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, holding that Congress did not 
waive the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act ("ICRA").29 Further, the Court in Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing Technologies30 sustained a tribe's sovereign immunity 
from suit, stating that a tribe's sovereign immunity in federal court ex­
tends to tribal commercial and governmental activities both on and off 
the reservation.31 
Although Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts sub­
ject matter jurisdiction in cases involving tribes,32 a sovereign party, 
such as a tribe, can raise the defense of sovereign immunity to pre­
clude litigation against it.33 Sovereign parties also may waive the de­
fense of sovereign immunity. Several statutes currently waive the 
United States' sovereign immunity.34 States, tribes, and foreign nations 
may statutorily waive their sovereign immunity.35 Tribes may waive 
tribal sovereign immunity in federal court through contract.36 Congress 
27. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
28. Although the Court developed the defense of sovereign immunity for tribes in fed­
eral courts under federal law in United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., the 
Court first mentioned the defense in Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). In Turner, 
the Court explained, "(w]ithout authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then 
have been sued in any court; at least without its consent." Id. at 358. 
29. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978); accord Okla. Tax Comm'n v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). The Indian Civil Rights 
Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994), extends some but not all of the rights guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights to interactions between individuals and Indian tribes. For more information on 
the ICRA, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 505-09. 
30. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
31. See 523 U.S. at 760 ("Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those 
contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or 
off a reservation."). The sovereign immunity of a tribe under federal law in federal court re­
flects a theory of absolute sovereign immunity and mirrors the sovereign immunity given to 
foreign sovereigns prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See 
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 
(1988). 
32. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
33. The Federal Circuit discusses the difference between sovereign immunity and sub­
ject matter jurisdiction in Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569, 1573-74 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
3 4. CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 26, at 593. Chemerinsky specifically lists three acts - the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Tucker Act - that 
waive United States federal sovereign immunity. 
35. Id.; see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 
1991 ); DELLAPENNA, supra note 31, at 196-200 (waivers by foreign nations). 
36. See, e.g., C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001). 
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may also waive tribal sovereign immunity.37 A waiver of tribal sover­
eign immunity by either the tribe or Congress "cannot be implied but 
must be unequivocally expressed."38 
In addition to the acknowledgement of tribal sovereign immunity 
under federal law, tribes have adopted the notion of sovereign immu­
nity and developed their own doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
under tribal law.39 Like the state and federal governments, tribes have 
developed waivers of tribal sovereign immunity through contracts and 
tribal codes.40 Thus, tribal sovereign immunity exists not only under 
federal law in federal courts, but also under tribal law in tribal courts.41 
When a question arises as to whether tribal sovereign immunity has 
been waived, the waiver may have occurred by either tribal or federal 
action.42 When a waiver occurs, it usually occurs under tribal law.43 
A second defense available to Indian tribes is tribal exhaustion.44 
In National Farmers Union Insurance . Cos. v. Crow Tribe,45 the 
37. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty, the Supreme Court determined that a defense 
of tribal sovereign immunity under federal law in federal court could be waived by congres­
sional consent. 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940). The United States Congress has waived tribal 
sovereign immunity through statute, such as the Indian Tucker Act. 
38. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. King, 395 
U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). Sovereign immunity for tribes exists in federal courts unless Congress has 
abrogated sovereign immunity for the tribe through legislation or the tribe has waived tribal 
sovereign immunity on its own. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
Increasingly, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has been attacked as too extensive. 
The commentary in Kiowa implies that the Court's re-affirmation of the extent of tribal sov­
ereign immunity under federal law stands on shaky ground. See id. The attack intensified 
with the introduction of a bill in Congress by Senator Slate Gorton to curtail tribal sovereign 
immunity under federal law. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 385. 
39. Rave v. Reynolds, 23 ILR 6150, 6161 (Winn. Sup. Ct. 1996) ("This court notes that 
notions of governmental immunity, such as tribal sovereign immunity, while adopted as 
tribal law as most tribal governments moved to western style forms of organization, never­
theless constitute distinctly Anglo-American legal doctrines, having no parallels in tradi­
tional Indian life where most positions of leadership were the result of earned respect of 
lineage and leaders ruled by example, wisdom, and respect, rather than coercion."). 
40. A number of tribes, such as the Cheyenne River Sioux and Winnebago Tribe of 
Nebraska, have incorporated a defense of tribal sovereign immunity into their tribal codes. 
See WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEBRASKA CODE tit. 1 § 919 (1994); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX 
CODE ch. VIII § 1-8-4 (1978). Other tribes, such as the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, have 
adopted tort waiver statutes similar to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
41. See supra note 39. 
42. The Supreme Court acknowledged the difference between waivers by tribal action 
and waivers by federal action in C & L Enters. v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 
( 2001). 
43. A survey of tribal sovereign immunity cases indicates that tribal law applies or could 
apply under normal choice of law rules. See, e.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian 
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2000); Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 1999); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
44. When a tribe raises the defense of tribal exhaustion, the court first determines its 
own jurisdiction over the suit. Then the court addresses the question of whether the tribal 
court has jurisdiction over the underlying suit. At this point, unless the tribal court clearly 
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Supreme Court addressed the question of "the proper scope of tribal 
court jurisdiction."46 Emphasizing the importance of tribal courts in 
promoting tribal self-determination,47 the Court in National Farmers 
does not have jurisdiction (such as in a case involving a criminal action involving a non­
Indian perpetrator), the federal court invokes the tribal exhaustion doctrine, requiring the 
plaintiff to exhaust its tribal court remedies before bringing suit in federal court. See, e.g., 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 {1987); Nat'! Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 {1985). Tribal exhaustion requires that tribal appellate courts have an 
opportunity to review the determinations of lower tribal courts. See, e.g., Basil Cook Enters., 
Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 914 F. Supp. 839 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). For more information on 
tribal exhaustion, see Melissa L. Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries Between Federal 
and Tribal Courts, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705 {1997); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal 
Remeclies: Extolling Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 
{1995). 
The most analogous state law doctrines to exhaustion under federal law are the absten­
tion doctrines, which contend that state court issues have to be decided before a case can be 
filed in federal court. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 735. The tribal exhaustion doc­
trine functions like a state abstention doctrine because it stays the federal court's jurisdiction 
until after the tribal court has heard and decided the merits of the case. Abstention doctrines 
are judicially created rules that limit the ability of federal courts to decide issues before them 
even though the jurisdictional and justiciability requirements have been met. See id. at 735. 
State abstention doctrines include: Pullman abstention, which "is required when state law is 
uncertain and a state court's clarification of state law might make a federal court's constitu­
tional ruling unnecessary," id. at 737, Thibodaux abstention, which establishes that "federal 
courts should abstain in diversity cases if there is uncertain state law and an important state 
interest that is 'intimately involved' with the government's 'sovereign prerogative,' " id. at 
752, Burford abstention, which dismisses a case entirely because complex state administra­
tive procedures completely displace federal court review, id. at 755, and Colorado River ab­
stention, which provides for abstention to avoid duplicative litigation, id. at 820. Although 
there is no question that the tribal exhaustion doctrine is functionally similar to state absten­
tion doctrines, scholars disagree on which state abstention doctrine the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine most parallels. See Jones, supra note 6, at 490-91; Koehn, supra, at 720-21. This dis­
agreement, however, merely indicates that the tribal exhaustion doctrine, although function­
ally similar to state abstention doctrines, does not clearly parallel any of the state doctrines. 
45. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
46. Id. at 852. Tribes retain civil jurisdiction over tribal members on Indian lands. Tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on Indian lands is more conflicted. The Supreme Court lim­
ited the criminal jurisdiction of tribes to member and nonmember Indians in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers de­
pends upon whether the activity takes place on Indian lands and whether the individual has 
consented to tribal jurisdiction or may endanger the health and welfare of the tribe. See 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that the tribal court could not assert jurisdic­
tion over civil claims against state officials who entered tribal lands to execute a state search 
warrant); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribes do not have ad­
judicatory authority over the personal injury actions between two nonmembers on Indian 
lands); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that a tribe may 
regulate "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or 
its members ... [and a) tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over 
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens 
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe"); see also WILLIAM c. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 141 (3d ed. 1998). For more information on Public Law 280, which grants some 
states limited civil jurisdiction on tribal lands, see Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The 
Limits of Stale Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 537-59 (1975). 
47. Although tribal courts have been recognized as venues for the resolution of disputes 
since Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), explicit federal policy encouraging 
the creation and development of tribal courts commenced in 1934 with passage of the Indian 
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held that the plaintiff needed to exhaust its tribal court remedies be­
fore it could sue in federal court.48 The tribal exhaustion doctrine 
mandates that when a defendant asserts a colorable claim of tribal 
court jurisdiction,49 federal courts should give precedence to the tribal 
courts to determine their own jurisdiction and to hear the case prior to 
federal court adjudication.50 
The Court extended tribal exhaustion in Iowa Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. LaPlante,51 holding that a federal district court may not exercise 
diversity jurisdiction over a dispute before an appropriate tribal court 
first has an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. The Court in 
Iowa Mutual indicated that federal courts have limited powers of re­
view after tribal remedies have been exhausted.52 This limited review 
of tribal court action by federal courts after tribal exhaustion leaves no 
federal forum for adjudication on the merits if the tribal court has ju­
risdiction. 53 
Tribal defendants often assert defenses of tribal sovereign immu­
nity and tribal exhaustion simultaneously, raising the question of 
which defense federal courts should hear first.54 The Supreme Court 
Reorganization Act. See Jones, supra note 6, at 470-71. Since 1934, tribal court systems have 
flourished; almost 150 tribal courts exist today. See Koehn, supra note 44, at 711. 
48. Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56 ("[T)he existence and extent of a tribal court's ju­
risdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that 
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant 
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative 
or judicial decisions. We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance 
in the Tribal Court itself."). The Court also held that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. The Court in National Farmers established three exceptions to tribal exhaus­
tion. Id. at 856 n.21. According to the Supreme Court, exhaustion is not necessary "where an 
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, 
when "the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions," and if exhaus­
tion "would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's 
jurisdiction. " Id. The Court stated it would preclude tribal exhaustion in cases where a fed­
eral court could not review the tribe's assertion of its own jurisdiction. It is unclear whether a 
court has ever refused to apply the tribal exhaustion doctrine for this reason. 
49. A colorable claim of tribal law occurs when the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction 
is plausible and appears to have a valid or genuine basis. See Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1992). 
50. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d. 21, 
31 {1st Cir. 2000) ("The tribal exhaustion doctrine holds that when a colorable claim of tribal 
court jurisdiction has been asserted, a federal court may (and ordinarily should) give the 
tribal court precedence and afford it a full and fair opportunity to determine the extent of its 
own jurisdiction over a particular claim or set of claims."). 
51. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
52. Id. at 19. 
53. Id. ("Unless a federal court determines that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, 
however, proper deference to the tribal court system precludes relitigation of 
issues raised . . .  and resolved in the Tribal Courts. "). 
54. A distinction may be drawn between the kinds of cases in which a tribe raises both 
defenses. Most often, interplay between the two defenses arises when a question exists as to 
whether the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived. Interplay may emerge in other 
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cases as well, particularly when part of the claim may be governed by tribal law rather than 
federal law. 
Cases involving a defense of sovereign immunity may be classified as either 
"nonwaiver" cases or "waiver " cases. Although some courts implicitly acknowledge this dis­
tinction, it has not been used explicitly. For instance, addressing the question of whether a 
tribe waived its sovereign immunity through an arbitration clause, the Supreme Court in 
C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001). indi­
cated the difference between a waiver and nonwaiver case without expressly classifying the 
two cases as such. The distinction between waiver and nonwaiver emerged in discussions 
about whether a waiver occurred. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
In nonwaiver cases, a tribal entity asserts a defense of sovereign immunity and there is no 
dispute over whether the tribe's defense of sovereign immunity under federal law has been 
waived either by federal statute, tribal code, or contract. See id. at 751; Cherokee Nation v. 
Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Masayesva v. Zah, 792 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Ariz. 
1992). Consequently, courts usually dismiss these cases because the tribe has sovereign im­
munity. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 751; Cherokee Nation, 117 F.3d at 1489; Masayesva, 792 
F. Supp. at 1178. There are two kinds of waiver cases: waivers by Congress ("federal waiv­
ers") and waivers by the tribe ("tribal waivers "). For an example of a federal waiver case, 
see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (addressing whether Indian Civil 
Rights Act waived tribal sovereign immunity). For an example of a tribal waiver case, see 
C & L Enters, 532 U.S. 411 (addressing whether arbitration claus� in contract entered into 
by tribe waived tribal sovereign immunity). In cases where the question is one of federal 
waiver (usually through statute), the question is purely one of federal law. See, e.g., Santa 
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49; TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999); N. 
States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 F. 2d 458 (8th Cir. 
1993) (holding that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act clearly indicates that it ap­
plies to tribes and therefore, waives tribal sovereign immunity); Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that tribes may be sued in federal 
court under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). The lower courts are divided as 
to whether the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act waives tribal sovereign immunity for the lim­
ited purpose of enforcing compliance with the Act. See, e.g. , Montgomery v. Flandreau San­
tee Sioux Tribe, 905 F. Supp. 740 (D.S.D. 1995); Maxim v. Lower Sioux Indian Cmty., 829 F. 
Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1993). But see Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
The most complicated cases are those involving tribal waiver. See, e.g. , 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) 
(holding that a tribe does not waive its immunity from counterclaims by bringing an action); 
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986); 
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow 
Tribal Council, 940 F. 2d 1 239 (9th Cir. 1991) (addressing whether a tribal ordinance waived 
sovereign immunity). The lower courts are divided as to whether tribes forming tribal corpo­
rations under a provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1994), 
waive their tribal sovereign immunity because many of the charters issued confer the power 
to "sue and be sued." See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 874 F.2d 550 (8th 
Cir. 1989); Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970); cf. Boe v. Fort Belknap 
Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 
(Alaska 1977). These cases most often emerge in contract disputes involving the tribe and a 
non-governmental third party. See, e.g., C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414 (holding that arbitra­
tion clause waived tribal sovereign immunity); Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie­
Montgomery Assoc., 86 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that immunity was waived when 
the agreement contemplates possible judicial enforcement); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U 
Construction Co, 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 819 (1995); see also 
Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 
2000); Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1993); Stock West 
Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992). Although the parties may include a forum se­
lection clause in the contract, and therein specify the law that applies to the contract and the 
proper forum in which to adjudicate any conflicts arising under the contract, see C & L 
Enters., 532 U.S. at 415-16 (determining that the arbitration clause in the proposed contract 
specified both the choice of law and the forum for adjudication), more often than not the 
parties do not specify either a choice of law or a forum for adjudication. See, e.g. , Altheimer 
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has failed to establish with sufficient clarity how to address a case in 
which the tribal defendants present defenses of both tribal exhaustion 
and tribal sovereign immunity.55 The order that federal courts hear de­
fenses of sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion implicates judicial 
efficiency and tribal sovereignty, and may determine the outcome of 
the case.56 Further, courts' divergent invocation of the tribal exhaus­
tion doctrine has resulted in an uneven application of the two doc­
trines, allowing for differing standards and treatment for similarly 
situated tribal defendants.57 Thus, the lack of clear direction from the 
Court, accompanied by the complexity of the federal-Indian relation­
ship, has left the courts of appeal in disarray.58 
& Gray, 9 83 F.2d at 893; Stock West Corp., 964 F.2d at 9 12. Further, even when contracts do 
include such a clause, the forum selection or choice of law clause may not be clear. For in­
stance, in C & L Enterprises, even though the Supreme Court decided that the provisions of 
the arbitration and the forum selection clauses were clear, the three courts that heard the 
case differed in how they interpreted the clauses. 532 U.S. at 4 14-420; see also Ninigret Dev. 
Corp. , 2f17 F.3d at 2 1. In these cases, the tribe raises both defenses of tribal sovereign immu­
nity and tribal exhaustion. Tribal exhaustion is normally sought in waiver cases so that the 
tribe is given the first opportunity to interpret the meaning of the waiver clause. See Davis v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990 ( 8th Cir. 1999); Stock West, 964 F.2d at 
9 12. Tribal exhaustion, however, may also be sought in nonwaiver cases to resolve tribal law 
issues that do not pertain to questions of whether tribal sovereign immunity has been 
waived. 
55. See Reynolds, supra note 44, at 1113- 14 (" When the Supreme Court first articulated 
the tribal exhaustion rule, it provided few hints about when the lower courts should apply 
it. . . .  Predictably, the federal courts have disagreed about when to require tribal exhaus­
tion. "). 
56 . In cases where a tribal entity has sovereign immunity, the federal court dismisses the 
case without prejudice. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 ( 197 8). The 
plaintiff can file a suit against a tribe in federal court but sovereign immunity precludes liti­
gation on the merits and ends the case. Tribal exhaustion merely stays the exercise of the 
federal court's jurisdiction and adjudication of the question of whether the tribal court has 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 4 80 U.S. 9 ( 19 87). Tribal exhaustion 
allows the tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction and then for the federal court to re­
hear the case if necessary. Id. 
57. For instance, when a court applies the tribal exhaustion doctrine in a nonwaiver 
case, the tribe may have to reappear in federal court to defend on the grounds of its sover­
eign immunity. 
58. Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that plaintiffs need to exhaust their 
claims in tribal court before a federal court can hear the tribal entity's defense of tribal sov­
ereign immunity. Davis, 193 F.3d 9 90; Stock West, 964 F.2d 9 12. In Davis, the Eighth Circuit 
argued that a purported waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribe does not prevent invoca­
tion of the tribal exhaustion doctrine when the waiver concerns issues of tribal law. See 
Davis, 193 F.3d at 992. The court explained that exhaustion is required because the Supreme 
Court determined that issues of tribal sovereign immunity are exactly the kind of questions 
that need to be decided by tribal courts. Id. The Ninth Circuit, in Stock West Corp. , con­
tended that all tribal law issues have to be exhausted in the tribal courts before a federal 
court can hear a defense of tribal sovereign immunity. Stock West, 964 F.2d at 920. Other 
circuits have decided the issue differently. The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held 
that the defense of tribal sovereign immunity should be heard before invocation of the tribal 
exhaustion doctrine. In Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck 
Housing Authority, the First Circuit argued that federal courts should hear defenses of sov­
ereign immunity first as long as federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists even though the 
purported waiver in the case identified the tribal council as the mediator of all disputes. 207 
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This Note will show that, in tribal waiver cases, federal courts 
should address sovereign immunity first, but conditionally deny sover­
eign immunity in ambiguous cases and proceed directly to the tribal 
exhaustion defense. When a federal court finds tribal exhaustion, the 
case then has to be heard in tribal court before a federal court can re­
visit the case.59 This allows the tribal court to determine whether or 
not the tribe has waived its sovereign immunity. 
This Note argues that federal courts should hear defenses of tribal 
sovereign immunity before hearing those of tribal exhaustion. Part I 
argues that courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity 
first because federal courts treat sovereign immunity like jurisdiction: 
whereas, most courts treat tribal exhaustion as a matter of comity 
similar to abstention. Part II proposes a model for hearing tribal de­
fenses in federal courts. It asserts that the immunity defense should be 
heard first in both federal and tribal waiver cases. In tribal waiver 
cases, however, courts should provisionally deny tribal sovereign im­
munity and proceed to address tribal exhaustion, so that the tribal 
court can interpret the waiver. This Note concludes that hearing de­
fenses of tribal sovereign immunity before tribal exhaustion promotes 
judicial efficiency and tribal sovereignty. 
I. COURTS SHOULD HEAR TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FIRST 
BECAUSE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS JURISDICTIONAL 
This Part argues that federal court practice supports the hearing of 
sovereign immunity defenses prior to defenses based on abstention 
doctrines. Section I.A asserts that because federal courts treat sover­
eign immunity like jurisdiction, courts should hear defenses of tribal 
sovereign immunity first. While general federal rules do not always 
apply to Indian tribes,64l the nature of the application of tribal sover-
F.3d at 29. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo dismissed an action 
against a tribe for an alleged breach of contract on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity 
without ever getting to the exhaustion defense. 181 F.3d at 680. In another contract case, 
Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Co., the Seventh Circuit found that the tribe had waived its 
sovereign immunity and denied application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine because the 
case did not present any questions of tribal law and the tribe had consented to the jurisdic­
tion of the Illinois state courts in the letter of intent to contract. 983 F.2d at 812-13. 
59. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. , 480 U.S. 9; Nat'I Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 
471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
60. Because tribes retain sovereignty, general rules set out by the federal courts do not 
always apply when a tribe or a tribal member is involved. For instance, the Court in Durfee 
v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963), explained that a court's jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by 
another court. Id. at 111, 113 (" From these decisions there emerges the general rule that a 
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit - even as to questions of jurisdiction - when 
the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated 
and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment. . . .  One trial of an 
issue is enough. The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to 
other issues.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Conversely, the Court in 
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eign immunity and tribal exhaustion requires federal courts to follow 
the general rule of hearing jurisdictional issues, including the defense 
of sovereign immunity, first. Section I.B argues that the tribal exhaus­
tion doctrine is not jurisdictional but rather a matter of comity, and 
thus should be heard second. 
A. Courts Treat Defenses of Sovereign Immunity Like Jurisdiction 
Federal courts hear jurisdictional questions prior to other ques­
tions because the Supreme Court decided in Ex Parte McCardle that 
"[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause."61 
Furthermore, federal courts prefer to hear jurisdictional issues first 
because it is more efficient.62 Although a court can hear a claim of lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction at any time,63 courts usually hear these 
claims as early in the litigation as possible to prevent the expenditure 
of court time and resources on a case that the court lacks the authority 
to hear.64 
Although federal courts have discretion over the order in which 
they hear defenses, federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sover­
eign immunity first because sovereign immunity pertains to the court's 
jurisdiction.65 While sovereign immunity is not jurisdictional per se, 
courts under common law practice treat sovereign immunity like juris­
diction by dealing with it before addressing other issues because sov­
ereign immunity acts as a bar to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.66 
National Farmers Union held that federal courts can review the jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
471 U.S. 845 (1987). 
61. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868). 
62. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) ("[W]e rec­
ognize that in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry. In 
such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature should impel the 
federal court to dispose of that issue first. Where, as here, however, a district court has be­
fore it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state 
law, and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, 
the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
63. FED. R. C1v. P. 12(h)(3). 
64. See, e.g., Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577, 587-88; Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 
U.S. 83 (1998); Mccardle, 74 U.S. at 514. 
65. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 
28 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[T]ribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature."). 
66. Although federal Indian law does not always parallel federal law, see supra note 43, 
federal court procedure for tribal sovereign immunity defenses closely follows federal court 
procedure for other sovereign immunity defenses. See Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 
47 F.3d 1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Regarding the relationship between waivers of sover­
eign immunity and grants of jurisdiction, the Court observed that '[t]he fact that Congress 
grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated all de­
fenses to that claim.' ") (quoting Blethchford v. Native Viii. of Noatuk, 501 U.S. 775, 786-87 
n.4 (1991)). 
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Because immunity defenses preclude the litigation of the case, these 
defenses go to the jurisdiction of the court and prevent the court from 
proceeding if the governmental entity has sovereign immunity.67 
Courts should address defenses of sovereign immunity prior to 
other defenses because courts have defined the nature of sovereign 
immunity as immunity from process.68 The Supreme Court in Hunter 
v. Bryant explained that the entitlement to immunity provides for im­
munity from suit rather than "a mere defense to liability."69 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court in Turner v. United States differentiated between a 
defense to liability, where the defendant presents a defense to the 
claims alleged against him, and the defense of tribal sovereign immu­
nity, which does not require the sovereign to defend the claim, but 
rather bars the litigation as a whole.70 Under this interpretation, sover­
eign immunity is not viewed as a defense to liability, but rather pre­
vents suits against the sovereign entity.71 Because the defense of sov­
ereign immunity prevents the sovereign from having to defend its 
action, it functions differently from other defenses which merely ad­
dress the defendant's liability.72 For instance, while abstention doc­
trines require a defense and mandate that the parties go through the 
legal process, sovereign immunity automatically results in the dis­
missal of the case.73 
Sovereign immunity pertains to jurisdiction in that the defense 
bars the court from exercising its jurisdiction. For example, in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court dismissed the question 
of whether the tribal government violated the ICRA by excluding cer­
tain individuals from its tribal membership because it determined that 
Congress had not waived tribal sovereign immunity in the ICRA.74 AI-
67. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Ad­
ministrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV . 867, 
880 (1970) ("[T]his defense [sovereign immunity] goes to the jurisdiction of the court, so that 
an appellate court will not only refuse to find a 'waiver' in the failure to raise the defense 
below, but will remedy, sua sponte, the failure to raise it upon appeal, and will dismiss the 
case, if necessary, over the objections of both parties.") (internal citations omitted). 
68. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); Turner v. United States, 248 
U.S. 354, 357-58 (1919). 
69. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227. 
70. Turner, 248 U.S. at 357-58. The Supreme Court in Turner held that the Creek 
Nation, like other governments, "was free from liability " under the doctrine of tribal sover­
eign immunity. Id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
74. ld. at 59 ("Nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief . . . .  In 
the absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude 
that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from 
suit."). After addressing the defense of sovereign immunity asserted by the tribe, the Court 
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though the Court had the subject matter and personal jurisdiction to 
hear the merits, the Court never reached the merits of the case be­
cause the tribe's sovereign immunity precluded the litigation.75 Simi­
larly, in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,76 the Court 
dismissed the company's breach of contract claim because of the 
tribe's sovereign immunity. 
The fact that courts hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity ei­
ther prior to or along with other defenses suggests that courts treat 
immunity defenses like jurisdiction because the merits of the case can­
not be litigated if the governmental entity has immunity. For instance, 
the defense of sovereign immunity often arises in cases where a fed­
eral court has to determine whether or not a tribe is an indispensable 
party.77 The courts hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity in con­
junction with indispensable party defenses because the court has no 
jurisdiction if the party has sovereign immunity.78 If courts cannot join 
an indispensable party because the party has sovereign immunity, the 
in Santa Clara Pueblo considered whether an officer of the Pueblo was protected by the 
tribe's sovereign immunity and if the federal court could provide declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Id. ("As an officer of the Pueblo, petitioner Lucario Padilla is not protected by the 
tribe's immunity from suit. We must therefore determine whether the cause of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief asserted here by respondents, though not expressly author­
ized by the statue, is nonetheless implicit in its terms.") (internal citations omitted). 
75. The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo determined that it could not grant declaratory or 
injunctive relief to the plaintiffs because "the structure of the statutory scheme and the leg­
islative history of Title I suggest that Congress' failure to provide remedies other than ha­
beas corpus was a deliberate one." 436 U.S. at 6 1. The Court stated "[c]reation of a federal 
cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in Title I, however useful it might be in 
securing compliance with § 1302, plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of pro­
tecting tribal self-government." Id. at 64. The Court did not indicate why it heard the tribal 
sovereign immunity claim first; however, by resolving the issue of tribal sovereign immunity 
before addressing the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the nonimmune defen­
dants, the Court suggested the primacy of tribal sovereign immunity as the first defense to be 
heard. 
76. 523 U. S. 75 1, 760 ( 1998). 
77. See Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Masayesva v. Zah, 
792 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
78. In Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, the D.C. Circuit decided that the issue of tribal sov­
ereign immunity had to be heard as a part of determining whether the Delaware Tribe was 
an indispensable party to be joined under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 
12(b)(7). See 117 F.3d at 1503. Similarly in Masayesva v. Zah, the Arizona District Court 
heard the San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe's defense of tribal sovereign immunity in conjunc­
tion with its determination of whether the tribe was an indispensable party to the suit. See 
792 F. Supp. at 1178. The Arizona District Court explained that the tribe's defense of tribal 
sovereign immunity was integral to the second part of its analysis of whether the tribe was an 
indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Id. at 1182. The court indicated that it had to 
hear the defense of tribal sovereign immunity in conjunction with the motion of indispensa­
ble party in order to determine whether the case could proceed or should be dismissed. Id. at 
1182. In Masaysva v. Zah, the court determined that the tribe was an indispensable party, 
but it could only be joined if it had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 1185. In making the 
defense of tribal sovereign immunity integral to the indispensable party analysis, the D.C. 
Circuit and the Arizona District Courts suggest that defenses of tribal sovereign immunity 
influence the outcomes of cases. · 
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case has to be dismissed.79 Further, federal courts indicate that sover­
eign immunity relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the case be­
cause they can raise the issue of sovereign immunity as a bar to the 
court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte80 and dismiss 
the case over the objection of both parties if necessary.81 The fact that 
courts can raise issues of sovereign immunity sua sponte stems from 
the centrality of jurisdiction to the authority of a court to decide a 
case; in evaluating whether it has jurisdiction, a court must determine 
whether one of the parties has sovereign immunity. 
Federal courts should treat sovereign immunity as jurisdictional 
because doing so promotes the efficient use of the court's time and re­
sources.82 Dismissing cases early in the litigation prevents the court 
from adjudicating issues over which it lacks authority.83 By not dis­
missing the case initially, the federal courts act inefficiently and poten­
tially waste the tribal court's valuable, and limited, resources.84 
B. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Is Not Jurisdictional 
Section LB explains that tribal sovereign immunity differs signifi­
cantly from the tribal exhaustion doctrine and therefore provides an­
other reason why federal courts should consider tribal sovereign im­
munity prior to tribal exhaustion. First, this Section suggests that tribal 
exhaustion resembles state abstention doctrines rather than jurisdic­
tional issues.85 Second, it maintains that tribal exhaustion differs from 
79. See Cherokee Nation, 117 F.3d 1489; Masayesva, 792 F. Supp. 1178. 
80. Mellos v. Brownell, 250 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1957); accord Tribal Smokeshop, Inc. v. 
Alabama-Coushatta Tribes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 717, 718 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1999) ("[S]overeign im­
munity goes to subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction."). 
81. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 283 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1960). 
82. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 591. 
83. See, e.g. , Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
84. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-588 (1999). Although 
most courts do not state explicitly that jurisdiction has to be heard first for efficiency rea­
sons, jurisdiction jurisprudence explains that jurisdiction is heard first to prevent the courts 
from hearing cases on the merits when the court does not have the authority to hear the 
case. See, e.g. , Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Mansfield, 
Coldwater & L. Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Ex Parte Mccardle, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1867). 
85. Conceptually, the tribal exhaustion doctrine may resemble the exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies doctrine more than state abstention doctrines. See supra note SO. The 
tribal exhaustion doctrine, however, does not parallel completely either the state abstention 
doctrines or the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Thus, the analogy made in 
this Part to the state abstention doctrines is meant to be merely illustrative in that it provides 
the reader with another more familiar doctrine as a way of showing how the tribal exhaus­
tion doctrine differs from sovereign immunity. Thanks to Padraic McCoy for suggesting the 
conceptual/functional distinction to me. 
The reasons the Court created the tribal exhaustion doctrines mirror those underlying 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow 
Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & 
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sovereign immunity in that it developed as a matter of comity, and 
thus does not pertain to the jurisdiction of the court. 
Unlike tribal sovereign immunity, which is analogous to jurisdic­
tion, invocation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is a matter of com­
ity.86 As a matter of comity, tribal exhaustion is conceptually like the 
doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies but functionally 
like abstention doctrines. Conceptually tribal exhaustion is like the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies because both advocate the 
hearing of the case in another forum before allowing federal court re­
view .87 The two doctrines, however, differ because the Administrative 
Procedure Act provides clear guidelines for the levels of review which 
exist in the exhaustion of administrative remedies;88 no such guidelines 
exist regarding tribal exhaustion.89 Functionally, the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine is like state abstention doctrines, which by definition differ 
from, and are heard subsequent to, jurisdictional issues.90 State absten­
tion doctrines developed as a matter of comity, allowing federal courts 
to defer to state court decisions in cases primarily concerning state 
law.91 These doctrines serve to promote federalism and harmony be­
tween state and federal courts.92 Similarly, the tribal exhaustion doc-
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 404-05 (1993). Both doctrines were devel­
oped to increase judicial efficiency and promote the expertise of tribal courts and adminis­
trative agencies. See Burlington N. R.R. Co.,  940 F.2d at 1245-47; cf AMAN & MAYTON, 
supra, at 404-05. 
86.
0 
See Koehn, supra note 44, at 705. Comity is the general principle that the courts of 
one state or jurisdiction give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction 
out of deference and mutual respect. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979). Courts 
exercise comity by acknowledging the validity of another court's decisions. 
87. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 85, at 409. The exhaustion of administrative remedies 
doctrine holds that plaintiffs are not entitled to judicial relief until after they have exhausted 
all of their administrative remedies. Id. at 406. The exhaustion of administrative remedies 
also serves many of the same purposes as the tribal exhaustion doctrine. The courts justify 
the administrative remedies doctrine on the grounds that (1) it gives the agency the first 
chance to resolve issues in light of its own policies and priorities, (2) it reduces litigation 
costs and judicial interference into the agency's work, and (3) the exhaustion of administra­
tive remedies is more efficient than judicial review because the specialization of agencies 
allows for the streamlining of the adjudication. Id. at 404-05. These reasons resemble the 
ones given by the Court in National Farmers Union. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. V. 
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). 
88. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1994). 
89. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 85, at 410. A major distinction exists between the 
tribal exhaustion doctrine and the exhaustion of administrative remedies in that the exhaus­
tion of administrative remedies only involves subdivisions of one sovereign. Tribal exhaus­
tion, however, involves the courts of two sovereigns - tribes and the federal government. In 
this respect, the tribal exhaustion doctrine is more like state abstention doctrines. 
90. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 735-37. 
91. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); 
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil 
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); R.R. Comm'n Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); see also 
supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
92. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737. 
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trine exists as a matter of comity, fostering mutual respect between 
federal and tribal courts.93 
Because abstention doctrines developed as a matter of comity, 
they do not pertain to the ability of the court to exercise jurisdiction 
over the case.94 Invocation of an abstention doctrine does not preclude 
a finding of federal court jurisdiction. Rather, once the court has de­
termined that it has jurisdiction,95 abstention mandates that the federal 
court either stay or dismiss the federal court proceedings so that the 
state court can hear the case.96 Similarly, tribal exhaustion requires 
that "the federal court stay [federal proceedings] in order to give the 
tribal court a 'full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.' "97 
Abstention doctrines allow the federal court to revisit the issues in the 
case after they have been litigated in the forum to which the federal 
court deferred.98 Because it is based on comity, the tribal exhaustion 
defense functions differently than tribal sovereign immunity. Sover­
eign immunity, like jurisdiction, is a question of whether a court can 
hear a case; comity, however, merely refers to the deference a court 
gives to another court by staying the proceedings until the other court 
decides the issues relevant to the application of its law.99 
Courts have not treated tribal exhaustion defenses like jurisdic­
tion.100 For example, in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. 
Crow Tribe,101 the Supreme Court held that even though the district 
93. See Koehn, supra note 44, at 726 ("Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity not 
as a jurisdictional prerequisite."). 
94. See id. at 72 5 ("It is clear from the Court's decisions in National Farmers Union and 
Iowa MU(ual that the tribal exhaustion rule is not jurisdictional . . . .  As a matter of comity, 
however, the Court declared that the federal courts should slay their hand until the tribal 
courts had an opportunity to look at the issue."). 
9 5. See Nat'! Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 8 4 5  (198 5). 
96. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 73 5-37. 
97. See Koehn, supra note 44, at 72 5. 
98. Pullman Abstention, which is mandated when a state law is uncertain and a state 
court's interpretation of state law may prevent a federal court's constitutional ruling, pro­
vides for the matter to return to federal court if the constitutional issue is still viable. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737-38. Other forms of state abstention, such as Burford 
Abstention, do not merely stay federal jurisdiction, but completely displace federal court 
review. See id. at 7 55. After the tribal court proceeding, the amount of review available in 
the federal courts is uncertain. In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court implied that federal 
courts are limited to review of questions of tribal court jurisdiction. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 3 53 (2001). 
99. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 31, at 9 ("Immunity rules, on the other hand, depend 
on the nature of the relation between the parties involved in the transaction or event, rather 
than on the relation of either of them to a court."). 
100. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (exhaustion 
as prudential); Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1992) (ex­
haustion as comity); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 124 5 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional bar. "). 
101. 471 U.S. 8 4 5  (198 5). 
November 2002) Tribal Sovereignty 587 
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute between a tribe 
and a non-Indian plaintiff, the plaintiff needed to exhaust its tribal 
court remedies before it could sue in federal court.102 The Court de­
termined that courts have to hear all jurisdictional issues prior to invo­
cation of the tribal exhaustion doctrine.103 Thus, it was only after the 
Court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction, and that no 
bars to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction existed, that it invoked 
the tribal exhaustion doctrine.104 If tribal exhaustion pertained to the 
jurisdiction of the court, the court would have heard this defense ei­
ther prior to or along with the other jurisdictional issues raised in the 
case.105 
Federal courts should hear defenses of sovereign immunity prior to 
tribal exhaustion defenses. Unlike tribal exhaustion, sovereign immu­
nity pertains to the jurisdiction of the court and its ability to decide the 
merits of the case, and a finding of sovereign immunity prevents fur­
ther litigation of the case and conserves court resources. 
II. A MODEL FOR HEARING TRIBAL DEFENSES 
IN FEDERAL COURTS 
This Part advances a model for federal courts to use in hearing 
tribal defenses based on the two types of cases in which the defenses 
of tribal sovereign immunity and tribal exhaustion arise. These cases 
include "nonwaiver" cases, in which no question exists as to whether 
tribal sovereign immunity has been waived, and "waiver" cases, in 
which a question of whether tribal sovereign immunity has been 
waived exists. Section II.A contends that federal courts should hear 
tribal sovereign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses 
in nonwaiver cases because no question exists as to whether the tribe's 
sovereign immunity has been waived. Section II.B distinguishes be­
tween waiver by the federal government and waiver by the tribe. It ar­
gues that in both cases courts should hear sovereign immunity de­
fenses first but that, in cases of tribal waiver, courts should 
conditionally deny the defense of tribal sovereign immunity pending 
an interpretation by the tribe. 
102. Id. at 845. 
103. See Nat'/ Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857; see also Koehn, supra note 44, at 717 ("As ex­
pected the Court first addressed the issue of jurisdiction since, of course, the Court needed 
jurisdiction to hear the merits."). The Supreme Court has not held that sovereign immunity 
is jurisdictional. The Court has only treated sovereign immunity like jurisdiction; thus, con­
fusion over the nature of sovereign immunity arises. 
104. Nat'/ Farmers, 471 U.S. at 849. 
105. See supra Section I.A. 
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A. Nonwaiver Cases 
This Section maintains that federal courts should hear tribal sover­
eign immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in non­
waiver cases. It also maintains that hearing sovereign immunity de­
fenses first protects tribal sovereignty by promoting tribal courts as an 
appropriate forum for litigation. Finally, this Section argues that 
hearing sovereign immunity defenses first does not preclude litigants 
from adjudication on the merits of the case. 
In nonwaiver cases, rather than purporting that the tribe waived 
tribal sovereign immunity, the plaintiff argues that initially the tribe 
did not have sovereign immunity.106 For instance, Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. is a straightforward nonwaiver case 
because the plaintiff argued not that the tribe's sovereign immunity 
had been waived either through congressional or tribal action,107 but 
that the tribe did not retain tribal sovereign immunity under the facts 
specific to the case.108 Because the Supreme Court determined that the 
Kiowa Tribe had sovereign immunity, the Court dismissed the case 
without hearing any further defenses or claims.109 Hearing tribal sov­
ereign immunity defenses first in nonwaiver cases not only is consis­
tent with current federal court procedure but also ensures judicial effi­
ciency and does not impede upon tribal sovereignty. Courts should 
hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in nonwaiver cases be­
cause it promotes judicial efficiency by making productive use of judi­
cial resources and preventing unnecessary litigation. 
As discussed in Section l.B, federal courts should hear sovereign 
immunity defenses prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in nonwaiver 
cases because hearing sovereign immunity defenses first promotes ju­
dicial efficiency.110 This is particularly true in nonwaiver cases. Federal 
courts act most efficiently when they hear tribal sovereign immunity 
defenses first because it allows them to dismiss the case upon finding 
that the tribe has sovereign immunity.1 1 1  This prevents the court from 
106. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
107. Id. at 753. 
108. Manufacturing Technologies did not argue that the tribe had waived its tribal sov· 
ereign immunity but that tribal sovereign immunity did not exist in the first place because 
tribal sovereign immunity did not extend to the tribe in business transactions occurring off 
the reservation. Id. at 753. The Court rejected this claim, holding that tribal sovereign im· 
munity does extend to commercial transactions entered into by a tribe off its reservation. Id. 
at 760. 
109. Id. 
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
111. Dismissing a case in which the tribal sovereign immunity is clear, as the Court did 
in Kiowa Tribe, prevents the unnecessary and prolonged litigation that could occur if courts 
heard exhaustion defenses before sovereign immunity defenses. When exhaustion defenses 
are heard first, the possibility exists that after tribal court proceedings the case will return to 
federal court. Thus, requiring exhaustion without addressing the tribe's sovereign immunity 
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engaging in unnecessary litigation and saves the federal courts and 
tribal defendants time and resources.11 2  
Even though some circuits advocate the hearing of tribal exhaus­
tion defenses prior to tribal sovereign immunity defenses in order to 
protect and strengthen tribal courts, the hearing of sovereign immu­
nity defenses first does not undermine the existence and activity of 
tribal courts.113 Some circuits argue that federal courts should hear 
tribal exhaustion first because this promotes tribal court development 
by allowing the tribe to determine its own jurisdiction in the first in­
stance.1 14  This position, while admirable, ignores the fact that in these 
cases tribal courts may have jurisdiction to hear the case regardless of 
whether a federal court has jurisdiction or grants an abstention 
through the tribal exhaustion doctrine.11 5  Because the tribal court's ju­
risdiction over the case is independent of that of the federal court, the 
federal court does not have to require tribal exhaustion for the tribal 
court to have jurisdiction unless one of the parties challenges the tribal 
court's jurisdiction.11 6  Thus, even if a federal court does not hear tribal 
exhaustion first, tribal courts still have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
existence of tribal court jurisdiction even when a federal court has not 
ordered tribal exhaustion promotes tribal court jurisdiction, because 
the tribal court exists as a forum in which the plaintiff can bring suit 
even if no federal forum has jurisdiction.1 17 
The ability of plaintiffs to sue in tribal court not only provides the 
litigant with an appropriate forum for adjudication but also strength­
ens the tribal court system. When a federal court finds sovereign im­
munity, the tribal court becomes the only forum in which the plaintiff 
could lead to a full adjudication in tribal court followed by proceedings in the federal courts 
in which the federal court then determines whether the tribe had tribal sovereign immunity. 
By dismissing the case, hearing defenses of sovereign immunity first conserves the resources 
of both federal and tribal courts. 
· 
112. Sovereign immunity saves federal courts time and resources because it bars the ex­
ercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 751 {1998); Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 
U.S. 506 (1940). 
113. See Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992). 
114. Davis, 193 F.3d at 992 ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated that the issue of a tribe's 
sovereign immunity is the very kind of question that is to be decided in the first instance by 
the tribal court itself."). 
115. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note l, at 520. 
116. See id. at 520, 635-43. 
117. For example, in Santa Clara Pueblo, the plaintiff could seek a tribal remedy even 
though the federal court decided that it could not exercise its jurisdiction due to tribal sover­
eign immunity. 436 U.S. 49. 
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may seek relief.1 18 The lack of federal court jurisdiction provides tribal 
courts with more opportunities to develop their own jurisprudence be­
cause they are the only fora able to hear the merits of the case. Al­
though some commentators and plaintiffs suggest that tribal courts are 
biased,11 9  federal courts have acknowledged the exclusive jurisdiction 
of tribal courts as providing claimants with an appropriate forum for 
the adjudication of claims.120 Thus, dismissing nonwaiver cases on sov­
ereign immunity grounds does not deny the plaintiff a forum for adju­
dication, because the plaintiff may be able to sue the tribe in tribal 
court.121 
Tribal sovereign immunity does not deprive litigants of a forum 
because hearing a defense of tribal sovereign immunity prior to a 
tribal exhaustion defense merely dismisses the federal court case; thus, 
it does not affect the ability of the litigant to sue in tribal court. The 
dismissal of a case in federal court due to a finding of tribal sovereign 
immunity in the federal courts does not preclude litigation in tribal 
court because the tribe may not have tribal sovereign immunity in 
tribal court.122 A tribe may in fact have sovereign immunity under fed-
1 1 8. State courts do not have independent civil jurisdiction over most cases arising in 
Indian country. For more information on state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction, see GETCHES 
ET AL., supra note l, at 520, 635-43. 
11 9. Although instances of tribal court bias exist, this argument is often overstated and 
used spuriously in attempts to preclude tribal court jurisdiction. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal 
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
2 85 (199 8); Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradic­
tion, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 3 81- 82 (1997). Consequently, fed­
eral courts often reject this argument. See, e.g., Davis, 193 F.3d at 992 (rejecting plaintiff's 
claim of tribal court bias as superfluous); A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 7 81 F.2d 1 411 ,  1 416-17 (9th Cir. 1 9 86) (rejecting argument that tribal judge was bi­
ased); Landmark Golf Ltd. P'ship. v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1 169, 1 176 (D. 
Nev. 1999); Bowen v. Doyle, 8 80 F. Supp. 99, 126-27 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting claim of 
Peacemakers court bias); AG Organic, Inc. v. John, 892 F. Supp. 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1 995) (as­
serting that plaintiffs claims of tribal court bias had to be heard first in the tribal court). 
Moreover, state court bias does not necessitate federal court jurisdiction. For instance, no 
matter how biased a state court may be, a case can only be heard in federal court if it meets 
the requirements for federal court jurisdiction. See GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 1, at 641-43. 
120. See, e.g., Santa Clara 'Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 ("Tribal courts have repeatedly been 
recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting impor­
tant personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."). 
1 21. See supra Section ILA. For examples of cases which suggest that tribal sovereign 
immunity deprives litigants of a forum, see, for example, Davis, 193 F.3d 990, and Stock 
West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1 992). 
1 22. In Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the court 
explained that a waiver of sovereign immunity in one court does not imply a waiver of sov­
ereign immunity in another court. Id. at 1574 ("That the Government has waived its immu­
nity in the Court of Federal Claims does not imply that the Government has waived its im­
munity in other courts."). Just as the federal government can waive sovereign immunity in 
one court but not another, in the tribal law context, it is entirely possible that a tribe would 
have sovereign immunity under federal law but not in tribal court. Tribal codes, such as the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Code, may provide for waivers of tribal sovereign immunity 
under tribal law but not federal law. 
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eral law, but not under tribal law because the tribe may have waived 
its sovereign immunity under tribal law either through a tribal code or 
contract.123 Thus, if the federal court dismisses the case, the plaintiff 
can still pursue the case in tribal court.124 
Federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity 
first in nonwaiver cases. Hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immu­
nity first prevents the inefficient use of court resources. Further, this 
order does not infringe on tribal sovereignty. Finally, hearing sover­
eign immunity defenses first does not preclude the litigants from hav­
ing their claims heard by an appropriate forum. 
B. Waiver Cases 
This Section argues that in both kinds of waiver cases, federal 
courts should hear sovereign immunity defenses first. This Section, 
however, goes on to assert that federal courts should provisionally 
deny sovereign immunity in tribal waiver cases, and should then in­
voke the tribal exhaustion doctrine so that the tribal court can deter­
mine its own jurisdiction in the case and interpret the waiver in ques­
tion. 
1. Federal Waiver 
Federal courts should hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses first 
because federal waiver cases do not present questions of tribal law. 
For example, Santa Clara Pueblo is a federal waiver case because the 
question of waiver is controlled by an interpretation of federal law.125 
The issue in Santa Clara Pueblo was whether Congress waived the 
tribe's sovereign immunity under federal law through the ICRA.126 
The Court decided that Congress had not waived the tribe's sovereign 
immunity through the ICRA and then dismissed the case against the 
tribe.127 If in federal waiver cases federal courts hear and invoke tribal 
exhaustion first, tribal courts would be required to interpret federal 
law. Even though tribal courts can interpret federal law,128 federal 
courts are better equipped to hear claims under federal law than tribal 
courts.129 Tribal courts do not have as much experience in the applica-
123. See, e.g., Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1171 ( 10th Cir. 1992) 
("When read together, the contract clauses are at best ambiguous regarding sovereign im­
munity in any court except tribal court."). 
124. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 6 5. 
12 5. Namely, the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59, 61-64. 
126. Id. at 59. 
127. Id. at 59. 
128. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 48 5 n.7 (1999). 
129. See infra Section 11.B.2. 
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tion of federal law as federal courts do.130 Further, having multiple 
tribal courts interpret federal law could lead to inconsistent applica­
tion of the law.131 Because the issue of waiver in these cases falls under 
federal rather than tribal law, tribal exhaustion should not be required 
in federal waiver cases. 
Hearing tribal sovereign immunity defenses first in federal waiver 
cases, as in nonwaiver cases, promotes judicial efficiency.132 As men­
tioned above, hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first en­
sures the efficient use of court resources by preventing the relitigation 
of the case in federal court after full tribal court proceedings.133 In fed­
eral waiver cases, the application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is 
especially inefficient because tribal court interpretation of federal law 
provides the federal courts with an additional reason to review the 
tribal court's assertion of its jurisdiction.134 The federal court could de­
cide to review the tribal court decision to determine whether the tribe 
correctly interpreted federal law.1 35 Thus, hearing defenses of tribal 
sovereign immunity first in federal waiver cases is more efficient than 
hearing tribal exhaustion defenses first. 
Federal courts should hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses 
prior to tribal exhaustion defenses in federal waiver cases because it 
promotes tribal sovereignty. Because sovereign immunity acts as a bar 
to the exercise of jurisdiction, hearing sovereign immunity defenses 
first and dismissing cases in which the tribe has sovereign immunity 
advances tribal sovereignty by keeping tribal defendants out of federal 
court.136 Further, the dismissal of a case in federal court advocates the 
increased use of tribal courts because it encourages litigants to pursue 
any remedies open to them in tribal court. 
2. Tribal Waiver 
This Section argues that in tribal waiver cases defenses of tribal 
sovereign immunity should be addressed first, for many of the same 
130. Justice Brennan's argument that permitting state courts to interpret federal law 
leads to inconsistent and incorrect applications of federal law can also be extended to tribal 
courts. See Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 828 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he possibility that the federal law will be incorrectly interpreted in the con­
text of adjudicating the state law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the 
district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions."). 
131. Id. 
132. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra Section II.A. 
134. This area of the law (federal review of tribal court decisions) remains unclear and 
federal courts may think they have more of a reason to review tribal court cases if tribal 
courts are interpreting federal law. 
135. See Merrill Dow Pharm., 478 U. S. at 828 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
136. See supra Part I. 
November 2002] Tribal Sovereignty 593 
reasons that federal courts should hear sovereign immunity defenses 
first in federal waiver cases. In tribal waiver cases, however, the ques­
tion of whether or not the tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived 
is one of tribal law. The Section asserts that in tribal waiver cases fed­
eral courts should conditionally deny the tribe's defense of sovereign 
immunity and proceed directly to the question of tribal exhaustion. 
This enables the tribe to interpret the waiver clause under tribal law.137 
In the course of its consideration of a tribe's defense of tribal sov­
ereign immunity, a federal court must determine the nature of the 
waiver. If the waiver is one that purportedly occurred under tribal law, 
the federal court should not address it. Instead, the court should con­
ditionally deny the defense, which would give it the authority to in­
voke the tribe's exhaustion defense.138 The court could then stay pro­
ceedings and mandate that the plaintiff return to tribal court. After 
the tribal court proceedings, the federal court could revisit the ques­
tion of waiver if necessary, and would have the benefit of the tribal re­
cord to inform its determination.139 This procedure will preserve tribal 
sovereignty, promote the development of tribal courts, and ensure that 
plaintiffs retain the opportunity to request federal court review.140 
A conditional denial promotes the three purposes underlying the 
creation of the tribal exhaustion defense: (1) to promote Congress' 
policy of tribal self-determination, (2) to practice judicial efficiency, 
and (3) to facilitate the expertise of tribal courts.141 Since the 1970s, the 
137. By granting a conditional denial of tribal sovereign immunity, the federal court 
could reconsider its denial after the tribal court proceedings. In this sense, the conditional 
denial functions like Pullman abstention, which requires a federal court to stay proceedings 
"when state law is uncertain and a state court's clarification of the state law might make a 
federal court's constitutional ruling unnecessary." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737; see 
also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). After the court stays its pro­
ceedings and the state court decides the uncertain question of state law, the matter may re­
turn to federal court for a decision on the constitutional issue if necessary. CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 26, at 738. 
138. The federal court, however, cannot invoke exhaustion without determining 
whether it has jurisdiction, and thus, it should address the sovereign immunity defense first. 
Because the federal court needs jurisdiction to reach exhaustion, a conditional denial of the 
sovereign immunity defense allows the court to require exhaustion so that it can benefit 
from the record developed in the tribal court proceeding. 
139. The federal court should hear issues of tribal sovereign immunity and allow the 
tribal court to decide issues of tribal sovereign immunity first because the !ribal court's in­
terpretation of the waiver clause under tribal law will inform the federal court as to whether 
it has jurisdiction over the case. See, e.g. , Basil Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 
F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) ( " Requiring that litigants present their jurisdictional arguments to 
tribal courts in the first instance promotes tribal autonomy and dignity and encourages ad­
ministrative efficiency by permitting the tribal courts to develop a full record prior to poten­
tial federal court involvement."); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
140. Plaintiffs retain the opportunity to request federal court review through the tribal 
exhaustion doctrine. 
141. See Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Burlington N. RR.Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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United States Congress has developed a policy of tribal self­
determination.142 Congress is concerned with protecting Indian tribes 
because they remain dependent domestic sovereigns within the United 
States.143 Conversely, Congress is not concerned with protecting the 
laws of an entirely separate sovereign because, as an independent sov­
ereign, it can protect its own laws.144 The congressional concern for 
tribal law follows the fiduciary relationship that has developed be­
tween the tribes and the United States.145 Because tribes are consid­
ered domestic dependent nations within the United States, the United 
States has a duty to protect their existence and development.146 
Federal courts act contrary to congressional policy by ignoring the 
distinction between tribal and federal waivers in interpreting waivers 
of tribal sovereign immunity. As a result, they undermine tribal law 
and the tribal courts.147 When federal courts ignore the distinction be­
tween tribal waivers and federal waivers, they blur the distinction be­
tween federal and tribal law and apply federal law in cases where the 
tribal court should be able to review the case in the first instance.148 
For example, in Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian 
142. Congress has promoted Indian self-determination through legislation, such as the 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (giving tribes significant 
control over the adjudication of child custody cases involving tribal children), the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) (recognizing the importance 
of traditional tribal religion), the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201 -2211 
{1994) {allowing for the expansion of the Indian land base), the National Indian Forest 
Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 {1994) (giving tribes greater control 
over the management of Indian forest resources), the Indian Mineral Development Act of 
1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101 -21 08 (1994) (providing tribes greater flexibility in entering into 
agreements for mineral development, the Indian Education Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2651 (1994), and the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458n, 458aa note, 
458aa-458gg (1994)). 
143. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
144. Id. 
145. A fiduciary or trust relationship exists between the United States and Indian tribes. 
Under this relationship, the United States protects Indians from their own improvidence 
such as entering into swindling contracts. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note l, at 328-57. 
146. Aspects of the fiduciary relationship between the United States and Indian tribes 
include the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for Indian tribes un­
der the Indian R�organization Act of 1934. See id. at 192-200. 
147. For instance, in Ninigret, the First Circuit ignored the distinction between tribal and 
federal law in the context of interpreting waivers of tribal sovereign immunity. Ninigret Dev. 
Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 28 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) 
("In Davis, the panel referred to National Farmers, but apparently confused the Court's ref­
erence to 'sovereignty' with 'sovereign immunity.' ") (internal citations omitted). 
148. The court in Ninigret blurred the distinction between tribal and federal law by in­
sisting that the question of tribal sovereign immunity was as much a question of federal law 
as it was of tribal law. Id. at 29 n.5 ("Principles of comity strongly suggest that the tribal 
court be allowed to determine, in the first instance, the scope of its own jurisdiction, whereas 
the issue of whether a suit may be brought against a tribe at all, in any forum, is of equal in­
terest to the federal and tribal courts.''). 
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Wetuomuck Housing Authority,149 the First Circuit insisted that tribal 
sovereign immunity is a question of federal law rather than tribal law 
because it viewed tribes - and presumably tribal law - as subject to 
absolute congressional control.150 The First Circuit argued that subject 
matter jurisdiction enables federal courts to interpret waivers of tribal 
sovereign immunity regardless of the law - tribal or federal - gov­
erning the waiver.151 The court thus used subject matter jurisdiction to 
subsume Congress' absolute control over tribal sovereignty. In allow­
ing federal rather than tribal courts to determine the question of 
waiver, the court made the application of the tribal exhaustion doc­
trine completely irrelevant to the question of waiver,152 and, moreover, 
ignored Congress' stated policy preferring the development of tribal 
courts. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress has plenary power 
over Indian tribes.153 When federal courts ignore stated congressional 
policy regarding tribes, they undermine that plenary power.154 Such 
149. For the facts of this case, see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. 
150. Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 29. 
151 . Id. at 29 ("[A]s long as federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists a defense predi­
cated on tribal sovereign immunity is susceptible to direct adjudication in the federal courts, 
without reference to the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine."). 
152. Id. The Nihigret court interpreted the waiver and then invoked tribal exhaustion on 
other issues because it determined that congressional plenary power over tribes allowed the 
court to read tribal sovereign immunity as a matter of federal rather than tribal law. This 
interpretation of plenary power made the issue of tribal exhaustion irrelevant to the ques­
tion of waiver by assuming that federal law rather than tribal law controlled the question of 
waiver. Id. ("[T]his conclusion flows naturally from the reality that the sovereignty of Indian 
tribes is subject to congressional control, with the result that tribal sovereign immunity is 
necessarily a matter of federal law."). 
153. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 
(1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). Several scholars, however, suggest 
that the plenary power doctrine lacks textual support and note that the Supreme Court cre­
ated the doctrine during the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, 
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Fed­
eral Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian 
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 260-265; Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Su­
premacy Clause for Indian Tribes: Reflections on Polishing the Chain of Friendship by Re­
considering the Legal Legacy of American Colonialism, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002). 
154. Here, the First Circuit focused on the plenary power claimed by Congress over 
Indian tribes while ignoring Congress's use of its own power to promote the development of 
tribal courts and tribal sovereignty. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit claimed to draw a distinc­
tion between federal and tribal law but failed to address how this distinction could interplay 
with questions of waiver. Rather, in determining that the tribe had waived its sovereign im­
munity, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the tribal code provisions dealing with tribal sover­
eign immunity. Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 1993) 
("SMC points to Sections 2-2-103 and 10-4-106 of the Sioux's Tribal Law and Order 
Code . . .  which reserve sovereign status and immunity for tribal entities . . . .  The Tribe, it­
self, by passing Section 10-4-106(1) of the Code, provides that sovereign immunity may be 
limited by a tribal entity's charter."). _The Seventh Circuit did not apply the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine even after dismissing tribal sovereign immunity because it said there were no issues 
of tribal law. Id. at 814 ("Here, there has been no direct attack on a tribal court's jurisdic­
tion, there is no case pending in tribal court, and the dispute does not concern a tribal ordi-
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disregard for congressional policy places the courts in potential con­
flict with Congress and raises serious separation of powers concerns.155 
In order to avoid such conflicts, federal courts should refrain from 
taking action that undermines the ability of tribal courts to hear tribal 
law issues. 
Not hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first not only 
places the judiciary in direct conflict with the congressional policy of 
tribal self-determination, but also threatens the sovereign-to-sovereign 
relationship between tribes and the United States government.156 The 
longstanding sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between the United 
States government and Indian tribes exists in a vast body of codified 
federal law.157 The defense of sovereign immunity developed out of re­
spect for separate sovereigns and this respect extends to tribal sover­
eigns as well.158 Although federal courts can certainly apply foreign 
law, and arguably tribal law is analogous to foreign law, congressional 
policy distinguishes the application of tribal law from simple choice of 
law doctrine.159 Congress has not developed a policy protecting or en­
couraging the development of foreign courts, nor has it established a 
fiduciary relationship with foreign governments.160 Federal courts that 
ignore the distinction between federal and tribal law undermine this 
established fiduciary sovereign-to-sovereign relationship. 
Federal courts should be able to grant conditional denials of tribal · 
sovereign immunity and allow for the renewal of the defense of tribal 
nance as much as it does state and federal law."). The Seventh Circuit, however, only main­
tained that there were no issues of tribal law because it failed to consider the interpretation 
of the tribal code as a tribal Jaw issue. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit, like the First 
Circuit, failed to grant tribal courts comity and thus, undermined the congressional policy of 
advocating tribal courts. 
155. Conflicts between Congress and the courts over federal Indian policy are not new. 
Most recently, such conflicts have arisen in two sets of cases. The first line of cases, dealing 
with the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution, has led to a prolonged constitutional dia­
logue over constitutional protections. The Supreme Court's decision in Employment 
Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) led to the passage of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1994). The Court's 
response to the legislation in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), led Congress to 
enact the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
An earlier conflict arose over the Supreme Court's decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 
(1990), and led to Congress altering the Court's decision through subsequent legislation, 
which reaffirmed the power of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all "Indians" on 
their reservation. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994). 
156. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
157. Codified federal Indian law includes treaties and congressional statutes. See 
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 305-72. 
158. See supra note 1 8  and accompanying text. 
159. Congress distinguishes the application of tribal law from simple choice of law doc­
trine by encouraging the development of tribal law. See supra note 142 and accompanying 
text. 
160. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text. 
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sovereign immunity in federal court in order to ensure judicial effi­
ciency and prevent unnecessary litigation .. This would resemble the 
Court's decision in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. , Inc., 
which affirmed the conditional denial procedures under Rule 50( c) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and explained the flexibility in­
herent in the interplay between motions for judgment as a matter of 
law and for a new trial.161 In Neely, the Court considered whether a 
Court of Appeals can order a dismissal or direct entry of judgment for 
the defendant after reversing the denial of a defendant's Rule 50{b) 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.162 The Court held 
that a Court of Appeals can order a dismissal because not allowing a 
court to order a dismissal would undermine the efficiency goal of Rule 
50, which serves to prevent unnecessary retrials.163 As in Neely, unnec­
essary litigation will be prevented by allowing the federal court to 
make an informed decision on the question of tribal sovereign immu­
nity .164 A conditional denial prevents unnecessary litigation because 
the tribal court develops a record on the question of the waiver of 
tribal sovereign immunity for the federal court to review in determin­
ing whether it has jurisdiction.165 The tribal court record may clarify 
the tribal sovereign immunity issue. Thus, the federal court can dis­
miss the case without engaging in further litigation. 
Although cases do not necessarily return to the federal courts after 
tribal adjudication, if one does and is dismissed for lack of jurisdic­
tion, 166 then allowing federal courts to conditionally deny claims to 
161. 386 U.S. 317 (1967). Rule 50 gives courts a wide range of flexibility in addressing 
whether a judgment as a matter of law should be granted. To begin with, parties to a case 
can raise a motion for a judgment as a matter of law on several occasions throughout the 
trial. RICHARD B. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 583 (2d ed. 
1995). If a movant's original motion under Rule 50 is denied by the court, the party can re­
new the motion at a latter stage in the trial, usually after all of the evidence has been pre­
sented. Id. at 584. The ability to renew the motion allows the court to seek more information 
prior to granting a judgment as a matter of law. 
162. 386 U.S. at 317. 
163. 386 U.S. at 326 ("But these considerations do not justify an ironclad rule that the 
court of appeals should never order dismissal or judgment for defendant when the plaintiff's 
verdict has been set aside on appeal. Such a rule would not serve the purpose of Rule 50 to 
speed litigation and to avoid unnecessary retrial. Nor do any of our cases mandate such a 
rule."). 
164. See supra note 98. 
165. See Basil Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 65 {2d Cir. 1997). 
The main difference between the ability to renew a judgment as a matter of law and a condi­
tional denial of sovereign immunity pending tribal court adjudication would be that in the 
latter, the information the federal court was seeking would come not from continuance of 
the case in federal court, but from the expertise of another adjudicatory body, namely the 
tribal court. 
166. For instance, after the federal court conditionally denies tribal sovereign immunity 
and invokes tribal exhaustion, the case has to be heard in tribal court before the federal 
court will rehear the issues in the case. Once the tribal court hears the case and all potential 
tribal remedies are exhausted, then the plaintiff can challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction 
598 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 01 :569 
tribal sovereign immunity appears to undercut the efficiency achieved 
by the general rule of hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity 
first. Federal courts apply both foreign and state law regularly167 so 
litigants could argue that the conditional denial further undermines 
efficiency by prolonging litigation in cases when the federal court 
could just apply tribal law.168 The efficiency goal, however, would not 
be undermined by a conditional denial because federal courts would 
only grant conditional denials in tribal waiver cases. Federal courts 
would still dismiss cases on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity in 
cases where questions of waiver did not exist.169 Further, allowing the 
tribal court to develop a record on the question of the waiver would 
actually encourage administrative efficiency by promoting the orderly 
administration of justice.170 
Federal courts should grant conditional denials of tribal sovereign 
immunity pending tribal court interpretation in tribal waiver cases be­
cause tribal exhaustion .provides federal courts with a tribal court rec­
ord which will inform the federal court's analysis of the waiver ques­
tion.171 For example, in cases where no forum selection or choice of 
law provision unambiguously delegates jurisdiction to a particular 
court or jurisdiction, the law that pertains to the contract remains un­
clear.172 In these cases, standard choice of law analysis indicates that 
in federal court. At this point, the federal court could decide that the tribe retains tribal sov­
ereign immunity under federal law and dismiss the case. See supra note 98 and accompany­
ing text. 
167. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 82-89. 
168. For instance, federal courts apply substantive state law in diversity jurisdiction pro­
ceedings. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For more information on the Erie 
Doctrine, see CURRIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 651-704. 
169. See supra Sections II A-B.1. 
170. See Basil Cook Enters. , 117 F.3d at 65; Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 
919 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he risks of the kind of 'procedural nightmare' that has allegedly de­
veloped in this case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal 
Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it 
may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will . . .  also provide other 
courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial re­
view."). 
171. See, e.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 
F.3d at 27-29 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000); Stock West, 964 F.2d at 919. Ambiguous waiver cases are 
cases in which it is not clear that the provisions of the contract waive the tribe's sovereign 
immunity. The federal courts have held repeatedly that a tribe only waives its sovereign im­
munity if the waiver is clear and explicit. See, e.g. , Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech. Inc., 523 U.S. 
751 ,  754 (1998). The Supreme Court has explained that C & L Enterprises is an example of a 
clear waiver case. In contrast, Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee Nation, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th 
Cir. 1992), is an example of an ambiguous waiver case. See id. at 1 171 ("When read together, 
the contract clauses are at best ambiguous regarding sovereign immunity in any court except 
tribal court. We hold that the contract provisions do not reach the high threshold required 
by Santa Clara Pueblo for clear expression of the Nation's waiver of sovereign immunity."). 
172. A forum selection or choice of law provision within the contract does not ensure 
that the applicable law is clear. See, e.g. , Bank of Okla. , 972 F.2d at 1171. 
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tribal law most likely would apply.173 Thus, federal courts should grant 
a conditional denial of tribal sovereign immunity, which allows for a 
reconsideration of the tribal sovereign immunity defense after tribal 
adjudication that is informed by the tribal record. 
Federal courts should conditionally deny tribal sovereign immunity 
defenses in tribal waiver cases because federal courts prefer not to in­
terpret tribal law.174 Not only do federal courts resist having to apply 
foreign law in general,175 but federal courts are particularly wary of 
applying tribal law because they argue that tribal courts present a bet­
ter forum for deciding issues of tribal law .176 Some federal courts have 
asserted that the federal courts are not competent to decide matters of 
tribal law and that for them to do so undermines notions of tribal­
federal comity.177 Federal courts also hesitate to apply tribal law be­
cause it impedes upon the dignity and autonomy of the tribe, which in 
most cases could easily apply its own law.178 Allowing federal courts to 
apply tribal law could also lead to inconsistent interpretation and ap­
plication of the law. Some federal courts observe this concern by 
maintaining that they should not hear tribal law issues because tribes 
and tribal laws retain "unique ethnic and cultural patterns" that may 
be misapplied or misinterpreted by other courts.179 This argument un­
derlies the long-standing federal court recognition of "the exclusive 
responsibility of Native American tribes to construe their own law."180 
Finally, the fact that federal courts prefer not to apply tribal law is 
evidenced by the very existence of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. 
Further, even though federal courts can interpret tribal, state, and 
foreign law, federal courts should hear defenses of sovereign immunity 
first and allow for tribal exhaustion in tribal waiver cases because 
tribal courts are better at interpreting tribal law than federal courts. 
173. See supra note 43. 
174. See, e.g., TIEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 681 (5th Cir. 1999); Basil 
Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); Clark v. Land & 
Forestry Comm. of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 380 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.S.D. 
1974). 
175. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS­
QUESTIONS 83-88 (6th ed. 2001). 
176. See supra note 174. 
177. Basil Cook Enters. , 117 F.3d at 66 ("Federal courts, as a general matter, lack com­
petence to decide matters of tribal law and for us to do so offends notions of comity under­
scored in National Farmers."). 
178. See id. at 65. 
179. See Clark, 380 F. Supp. at 204 ("It is not for the federal courts to become a general 
clearing house for these cases, but rather it is the function and affirmative obligation of the 
tribe in view of their unique ethnic and cultural patterns to exercise original jurisdiction in 
these matters."). 
180. See Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3611 (1994); Basil Cook Enters. , 
117 F.3d at 66 ("The Supreme Court has long recognized the exclusive responsibility of 
Native American tribes to construe their own law."). 
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Just as state courts are more experi at applying state law than federal 
courts are,181 the expertise of tribal courts ensures that they are better 
at applying tribal law.182 Several federal courts have recognized that 
tribal courts are better at applying tribal law than they are.183 In advo­
cating the hearing of tribal exhaustion defenses first, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized the need for tribal courts to interpret tribal law in the first 
instance.184 The expertise of tribal courts also underlies the purpose of 
the tribal exhaustion doctrine,185 and has long been recognized by both 
Congress and the judiciary of the United States.186 Further, tribal law 
differs from both state and foreign law, which federal courts interpret 
regularly .187 
In tribal waiver cases, federal courts should follow the general rule 
of hearing defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first but grant condi­
tional denials of tribal sovereign immunity, pending tribal court inter­
pretation of the waiver clause. Federal courts should grant conditional 
denials and invoke tribal exhaustion because this remains consistent 
with the federal court practice of hearing jurisdictional issues first. 
Second, the granting of the conditional denial remains consistent with 
Congress' policy of self-determination for Indian tribes. The condi­
tional denial also promotes the efficient use of federal and tribal court 
resources. Further, granting a conditional denial allows tribal courts to 
hear tribal law issues. Not only are tribal courts better at resolving is­
sues of tribal law, but allowing tribal courts to hear tribal law issues 
promotes tribal sovereignty. The use of a conditional denial also al­
lows for tribal courts to develop a record on the case to facilitate fed­
eral court proceedings. 
181. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has deferred to a state supreme court's 
interpretation of state law based on the principle that state courts are better at applying state 
law. See, e.g. , Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). Further, abstention doc­
trines support the view that state courts are better at deciding state law issues than federal 
courts are. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 737. 
182. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
183. See supra note 174. 
184. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Because a determi­
nation of this issue will require a careful study of the application of tribal laws, and tribal 
court decisions, the district court should have stayed its hand until after the Colville Tribal 
Courts have had the opportunity to resolve the question."). 
185. See, e.g., Basil Cook Enters. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 
1997); Burlington N. R.R. Co., 940 F.2d 1239. 
186. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Generally, federal courts should hear defenses of tribal sovereign 
immunity prior to tribal exhaustion defenses because this remains con­
sistent with federal court procedure, promotes judicial efficiency, and 
does not impede upon tribal sovereignty. Defenses of tribal sovereign 
immunity should be heard first because the federal courts treat immu­
nity questions like jurisdictional issues. Further, the federal courts 
should hear defenses of tribal sovereign immunity first in nonwaiver 
cases because no question exists as to whether the tribe's sovereign 
immunity has been waived. Thus, by hearing defenses of tribal sover­
eign immunity first, federal courts· can easily dismiss nonwaiver cases 
and save judicial resources. 
Federal courts should also hear tribal sovereign immunity defenses 
first in waiver cases. In federal waiver cases, hearing defenses of tribal 
sovereign immunity first allows the federal court to determine waiver 
questions arising under federal law and dismiss such cases when the 
tribe's sovereign immunity has been waived by Congress. In tribal 
waiver cases, federal courts should still hear defenses of tribal sover­
eign immunity first; however, they should conditionally grant denials 
of tribal sovereign immunity, pending tribal court adjudication, in or­
der to ensure that tribal courts have the first opportunity to interpret 
tribal law. Allowing tribal courts to do so prevents the inefficient use 
of judicial resources, promotes tribal sovereignty and the development 
of tribal courts, and develops a record to inform further federal court 
proceedings. 
